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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT
Seabrook v. City of New York'
(decided April 4, 2000)
Plaintiffs, Norman Seabrook, President of the Correction
Officers' Benevolent Association, and six named female
Corrections Officers, brought suit against the City of New York
and the Department of Corrections (hereinafter "DOC"), seeking a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the DOC from enforcing a new
directive forbidding corrections officers from wearing skirts while
on duty in contravention of their religious faith.2 Plaintiffs alleged
that the DOC's directive violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
Federal 3 and New York State4 Constitutions. 5 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on both plaintiffs'
federal and New York State claims.6 With regard to plaintiffs'
federal claim, the court reasoned that since the directive only
incidentally burdened plaintiffs' free exercise rights, it did not
involve an actual 'violation their rights.7 Additionally, the court
analyzed plaintiffs' claims under the compelling interest test
applicable under the New York State Constitution Article I, §3,
and denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding
that the "DOC had a compelling interest in the security and safety
of its corrections officers and inmates and that ... all Correction
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6218 (2d Cir. 2000).
2 ld. at *1.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof" Id. (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Id. (emphasis added).
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. The New York Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all
mankind; and no person shall be rendered incompetent ... on account of his
opinions on matters of religious belief ..... " Id.
5 Seabrook, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6218, at *2.
6
Id.
' Seabrook, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6218, at *4.
1
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officers are subject to duties which implicate DOC's proffered
security rationale for the directive."
8
On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the judgment of the
District Court, alleging that it abused its discretion in denying
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.9 The plaintiffs
alleged that the DOC directive violated the Free Exercise Clause of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution,
and Article I, §3 of the New York State Constitution.' 0 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the
District Court's denial of the injunction for an abuse of
discretion. 1
The court began its analysis by stating that "it is not a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause to enforce a generally
applicable rule, policy or statute that burdens a religious practice,
provided the burden is not the object of the law, but merely the
'incidental effect' of an otherwise valid neutral provision."
12
Accordingly, the court refused to find a free exercise violation,
reasoning that plaintiffs' failure to allege a discriminatory purpose
for the directive was fatal to the federal claim. 13 In addition, the
court scrutinized plaintiffs' free exercise claim under the
compelling interest test of the New York State Constitution: 14
The compelling interest test asks (1) whether a sincerely
held religious belief (not disputed here) is burdened by
government action and, if so, (2) whether the State has
demonstrated that the government conduct at issue 'serves
a compelling state interest, pursued by the least restrictive
means possible, and that such an interest would be
adversely affected by granting an exemption thereto. 15
The court agreed with the lower courts findings, reasoning
that the "DOC has a compelling interest in the security and safety
of its corrections officers ... and that ... all corrections officers
'Id. at *5.
9 Id. at *2.
10Id.
11 Id.
1 d. at *3.
13 Seabrook, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6218, at *4.
14 Seabrook, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6218, at *4.
" Id. at *5.
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are subject to duties which implicate the DOC's proffered security
rationale for the directive"'
' 6
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which
provides that Congress cannot make a law which hinders the free
exercise of religion, has been made applicable to the states by
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. 17  "The free
exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires."' 8 Thus, the
First Amendment clearly excludes all regulation by government of
religious beliefs as such. 19  The "exercise of religion" often
includes the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts,
along with belief and worship. The New York State Constitution
similarly provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship shall forever be allowed in the State
without discrimination.
2,
In Employment Division v. Smith,22 respondents were fired
from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization
because they ingested, for sacramental purposes, a drug, the
consumption of which the Oregon criminal law deemed to be
illegal.23  When respondents applied for unemployment
compensation, they were determined to be ineligible because "they
had been discharged for work-related 'misconduct.' ' ' 24  In
reversing that determination, the Oregon Court of Appeals held
that "the denial of benefits violated the respondents' free exercise
rights under the First Amendment. 25 On appeal to the Oregon
Supreme Court, petitioner argued that because state law deemed
consumption of peyote illegal, the denial of benefits was
16 id.
7 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990).
'1 d. at 877.
'9 Id. (citing Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).20 Id. at 877.
21 N.Y. CONST. art. I, 3.
22 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 872.
23 Id. at 874-75. The drug, peyote, is a hallucinogen listed as a Schedule I
controlled substance by the State Board of Pharmacy. Id.
24 Id. at 874.
25 Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 764 (1985), aff'd in part and
modified in part, Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 221 (1986), cert. granted,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989), rev'd, Employment Div. v.
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permissible. 26  The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the
respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits.27
The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that the unlawfulness of
respondents' peyote consumption was irrelevant to resolution of
their constitutional claim because the purpose of the "misconduct"
provision under which respondents had been disqualified was
inadequate to justify the burden placed on their religious
observance.28 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the
petitioner continued to maintain the relevance of the illegality of
respondents' peyote consumption to their constitutional claim.
The United States Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that "if a State
has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religious
motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it
certainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying
unemployment compensation benefits to persons who engage in
that conduct." 29 The United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded the case for
further proceedings. ° The Oregon Supreme Court considered
whether the Oregon controlled substance law was valid under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and concluded that it
was not. The United States Supreme Court later granted certiorari
to the petitioners.
The United States Supreme Court then proceeded to
consider whether the prohibition contained in the Oregon statute
was permissible under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents
argued that their claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated
under the Sherbert v. Verner balancing test.31  Ultimately, the
26 Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 221 (1986), cert. granted,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989), rev'd, Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).27 d. at 217-19.
28 Id. The purpose of the "misconduct" provision under which respondents had
been disqualified was to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation
fund, not to enforce the State's criminal laws. Id.
29 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 875 (quoting Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988)).
30 Id. at 876-77.
31 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). Under the Sherbert v.
Verner balancing test, a compelling governmental interest must exist in order to
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Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's decision, holding the
Sherbert balancing test inapplicable to free exercise challenges.
The Court reasoned that "to make an individual's obligation to
obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'.
. . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.
33
The Court ultimately concluded that the "compelling government
interest" test is inapplicable to an across-the-board criminal
prohibition on a particular form of conduct.34
The New York State courts, however, generally adhere to a
balancing test which includes a "compelling governmental
interest" component. In Matter of Miller,35 petitioner, a member of
the Amish faith, applied for a pistol permit. 36  The Allegany
County Sheriff refised the application because petitioner did not
submit a photograph as required by Penal Law §400.00(3).
37
Petitioner filed suit seeking an order directing the Sheriff to
exempt him from the statutory photograph requirement on the
ground that the photograph requirement violated his Federal and
State Constitutional rights to the free exercise of his religious
beliefs.38 The Allegany County Court held that petitioner was
entitled to an exemption on religious grounds. 39 The Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, reversed the lower court's decision
and dismissed the petitioner's claim.4 0 The New York courts have
adopted a traditional balancing test which involves a two-step
analysis: "(1) whether the party claiming the free exercise right has
established a sincerely held religious belief that is burdened by the
statutory requirement; and (2) whether the State has demonstrated
32 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 885.
13 Id. at 884.
34 Id.
3' 252 A.D.2d 156, 684 N.Y.S.2d 368, 172 Misc. 2d 105 (4th Dep't 1998).
36 Miller, 252 A.D.2d at 157, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 369, 172 Misc. 2d at 106.
37 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (2000). §400.00(3) states in pertinent part: "Each
individual signing an application shall submit one photograph of himself and a
duplicate for each required copy of the application." Id. (emphasis added).
31 Miller, 252 A.D.2d at 157, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 369, 172 Misc. 2d at 106. It is an
Amish belief that submission to a photograph would violate the Second
Commandment by creating a likeness of God's creation. Id.
39 In re Miller, 656 N.Y.S.2d 846, 172 Misc. 2d 105 (N.Y. County Ct. 1997).
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that 'the requirement nonetheless serves a compelling
governmental purpose, and that an exemption would substantially
impede fulfillment of that goal.' ' 41 In analyzing petitioner's claim,
the court found that petitioner had other methods of hunting deer
available to him so as to circumvent the photograph requirement
and stated that "deer hunting does not implicate a tenet of the
Amish faith, and the availability of other options reduces
significantly the burden imposed upon petitioner's exercise of
religious beliefs., 42 In applying the traditional balancing test, the
court held that the photograph requirement did not substantially
burden the free exercise of petitioner's religious belief.
43
In sum, federal and New York State law are similar with
respect to religious issues and treatment of Free Exercise
violations. In analyzing whether a statutory requirement violates
an individual's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion
under the Federal Constitution, courts historically applied a
balancing test to determine whether a requirement that
substantially burdens a religious practice is justified by a
compelling governmental interest.44 Where the challenged statute
is neutral and generally applicable, for example, a law that is not
specifically directed at a religious practice and is otherwise valid,
that balancing test is not applied by federal courts.
In Miller, the New York Court of Appeals specifically
stated that "the Court of Appeals has not definitely stated whether
the scope of Article I, §3 of the New York Constitution is
coextensive with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution." 45 However, the New York State courts
generally adhere to a balancing test which includes a "compelling
government interest" component. This "compelling governmental
interest" component requires more of a case-by-case determination
whether such a burden on specific individuals is constitutionally
41 Id. at 159-60, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 371, 172 Misc. 2d at 107.
42 Id. at 159, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 371, 172 Misc. 2d at 107. Petitioner
acknowledged that the sole reason he sought a pistol permit was to hunt deer and
further acknowledged that he could hunt deer by other means that would not
require a license or the submission of a photograph, although he preferred the
use of a pistol or revolver for deer killing. Id. (emphasis added).
"3 Id. at 159, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 371, 172 Misc. 2d at 107.
44 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 882-83; see also Sherbert, 374*U.S. at 402-03.
4
1 Miller, 252 A.D.2d at 158-59, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 370, 172 Misc. 2d at 107.
[Vol 17
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 17 [2001], No. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/4
2000 DUE PROCESS 15
significant and whether the particular interest asserted by the New
York State government is compelling. It seems that the traditional
balancing test provides greater protection to an individual's free
exercise of religion than the facially neutral and generally
applicable standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
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